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EIGHTEEN IS NOT A MAGIC NUMBER: WHY THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT REQUIRES PROTECTION FOR YOUTH AGED 
EIGHTEEN TO TWENTY-FIVE 
Tirza A. Mullin* 
ABSTRACT 
The Eighth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment. This Note argues that any punishment of 
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds is cruel and unusual without considering their 
youthfulness at every stage of the criminal process, and that it is unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment for these youths to be automatically treated as fully-
developed adults. This Note will explore in depth how juveniles differ from adults, 
both socially and scientifically, and how the criminal justice system fails every 
youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five by subjecting them to criminal, rather than 
juvenile, court without considering their youthfulness and diminished capacity. 
This Note proposes three reforms that, implemented together, aim to remedy this 
Eighth Amendment violation. First, the Supreme Court should apply the seminal 
cases of Miller, Roper, and Graham to eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds. 
Second, all states should extend the age of juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five, 
processing offenders twenty-five and younger through the juvenile system 
accordingly. Finally, every actor in the system—including courts, lawyers, and 
legislatures—should label eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as “youth” and 
consider their age at every stage of the criminal system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s American culture tells us that one becomes an adult 
upon the eighteenth birthday, which is why the criminal justice sys-
tem has traditionally set the age of juvenile majority at eighteen. In 
Roper v. Simmons,1 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this line 
may be over or under-inclusive but stated a “line must be drawn.”2 
A line must be drawn, but that line must be changed if it is uncon-
stitutional.  
States are responsible for setting the upper juvenile jurisdiction 
age limit, and the maximum age is eighteen or lower in forty-nine 
states.3 Vermont recently raised their majority youthful offender 
status age to twenty-one—the highest age of majority in the 
country.4 Scientific research, however, suggests that the human 
brain does not fully develop until age twenty-five.5 This arbitrary 
state-drawn line leaves youths aged eighteen- to twenty-five vulner-
                                                   
 1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 574. 
 3. John Kelly, In Another Big Year for “Raise the Age” Laws, One State Now Considers All 
Teens as Juveniles, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (June 25, 2018), https://chronicleofsocial
change.org/youth-services-insider/juvenile-justice-raise-the-age-vermont-missouri-state-
legislation. 
 4. Id.; see also Governor Signs Law Creating More Rational Juvenile Justice Policies in Vermont, 
DEP’T FOR CHILD. & FAMS.: DCF BLOG (June 1, 2016), https://dcf.vermont.gov/dcf-blog/
governor-signs-law-creating-more-rational-juvenile-justice-policies-vermont. 
 5. Although there is some debate on the exact age, most research indicates that the 
brain continues to develop into the mid-twenties up to age twenty-five. See Mariam Arain et 
al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 449–61 
(2013); Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens 
Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469 (2000); David Pimentel, The Widening Maturi-
ty Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles As Adults in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 71, 73 (2013); Kevin J. Holt, The Inbetweeners: Standardizing Juvenileness and Recognizing 
Emerging Adulthood for Sentencing Purposes After Miller, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2015). 
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able to the harsh contours of the adult criminal system instead of 
the juvenile system where they belong. 
The distinction between the juvenile and adult criminal system 
is important. The juvenile justice system is focused on 
rehabilitation, while the adult criminal system is shaped primarily 
by punitive ideologies. The Supreme Court treats youth 
“delinquents” differently than their adult “criminal” counterparts, 
placing delinquents in detention centers whose mission is to 
rehabilitate, not to punish.6 The Court has recognized that rather 
than a “right to be punished, young people, specifically 
adolescents, instead uniquely possess the quite different—indeed 
in many ways antithetical—constitutional ‘right to a meaningful 
opportunity to be rehabilitated.’”7 A primary justification behind 
the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile system is that “kids are 
different.”8 The Supreme Court has indicated that “juveniles are 
generally—though not necessarily in every case—less morally 
culpable than adults who commit the same crimes.”9 This reduced 
culpability does not magically vanish at age eighteen. In fact, 
scientific research suggests that the differences between children 
and adults that render children less morally culpable persist until 
approximately age twenty-five.10 
Part I of this Note will outline the scientific and societal support 
for the notion that eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are, in many 
ways, more similar to children than adults. Part II will explain how 
automatically treating these individuals as adults without consider-
ation of their youthfulness violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on excessive punishments. The final part of this Note, Part III, will 
propose three reforms to remedy this Eight Amendment violation. 
These solutions, working in tandem, would mandate individualized 
consideration of eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds’ age throughout 
their interactions with the criminal justice system.  
                                                   
 6. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1967) (describing the rehabilitative history of ju-
venile court laws). 
 7. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
570 (2005) (claiming that from “a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the 
failings of a minor with those of an adult” because a juvenile’s irresponsible acts are less 
morally reprehensible). 
 8. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 526. 
 9. Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sen-
tencing, 47 HARV. L. REV. 457, 499 (2012) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 88 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring)). 
 10. See, e.g., Pimentel, supra note 5, at 73. 
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I. EIGHTEEN IS NOT A MAGIC NUMBER
A. Miller Line of Cases
Courts have recognized the differences in culpability between 
young offenders and fully mature adults for decades. The Supreme 
Court issued a series of landmark decisions regarding juvenile cul-
pability in Roper v. Simmons,11 Graham v. Florida,12 and Miller v. Ala-
bama.13 In each case, the Court found three differences between ju-
veniles and adults: juveniles (1) have a “lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” often resulting in “impet-
uous and ill-considered actions and decisions”; (2) are “more vul-
nerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure”; and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not 
as well formed as that of an adult.”14 These key differences suggest 
that youth are less culpable for their actions than their adult coun-
terparts, and therefore the traditional justifications for criminal 
punishment—retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation—are less 
applicable to young criminal defendants. The Court decided to fo-
cus on rehabilitative rationales accordingly, which do not result in
the death penalty or automatic life without the possibility of pa-
role.15 Rehabilitation is considered more fitting for juvenile of-
fenders because they have “greater prospects for reform.”16 In each 
of these groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions, however, the 
juvenile before the justices was under the age of eighteen, and 
therefore the corresponding juvenile protections are limited to de-
fendants under that age of majority.17 The Supreme Court has yet 
to confront a case that would allow it to directly reconsider extend-
ing Roper’s protections to defendants older than eighteen.
In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled in Roper v. Simmons, that the 
death penalty for juveniles younger than eighteen was categorically 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.18 The Roper Court recognized that 
11. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
12. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
13. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
14. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); see 
also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569); Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72 (quot-
ing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
15. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
16. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
17. In Roper, the defendant was seventeen years old. 543 U.S. at 556. In Graham, the 
defendant was sixteen years old. 560 U.S. at 53. In Miller, the defendants were fourteen years 
old. 567 U.S. at 465.
18. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
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the “qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disap-
pear when an individual turns eighteen,” but nonetheless stated 
that a line needed to be drawn somewhere.19 The Roper Court 
chose to draw the line at eighteen because it is “the point where 
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 
adulthood.”20 However, the Court did not have access to today’s 
neuroscience research regarding adolescent brain development.21 
Then, the Court decided Graham v. Florida in 2010 ruling that 
life imprisonment for juvenile non-homicide offenders was uncon-
stitutional under the Eighth Amendment.22 The Court noted the 
same differences between children and adults as the Roper Court 
and determined that “these differences render suspect any conclu-
sion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders:”23  
The Graham Court noted three significant developmental 
gaps between adolescents and adults: impulsivity linked to 
developmental factors, susceptibility to external pressures, 
and a still-developing identity. Indeed, what made these 
youthful traits salient in the justice context, according to 
the Court, was that they at once lessened a child’s “moral 
culpability” and increased the probability that with time 
and attendant neurological development, the child’s “defi-
ciencies will be reformed.”24 
The Supreme Court then borrowed the Roper Court’s age cut-off to 
prohibit mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile of-
fenders under the age of eighteen in Miller v. Alabama.25 The Court 
did not bar discretionary life without parole sentences for juveniles, 
but rather “mandate[d] only that a sentence follow a certain pro-
cess—considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstanc-
es—before imposing a particular penalty.”26 It adopted the founda-
tional principles of Roper and Graham, holding that severe 
sentences could not be imposed on juveniles “as though they were 
not children,” and therefore mandatory life without parole sen-
tences were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.27 
                                                   
 19. Id. at 574. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 
2018). 
 22. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
 23. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 24. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does A Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law 
and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 774 (2016) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69). 
 25. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. 
 26. Id. at 483. 
 27. Id. at 474. 
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Again, the Court defined “juvenile” as those under eighteen with-
out considering moving the arbitrary line or providing evidence to 
support its adoption.28 
B.  Brain Development 
The underlying concerns about the developmental differences 
between adults and youths that animated these landmark decisions 
extend beyond age eighteen. The traditional age cut-off at eight-
een is a social construction, rather than a scientific one. In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Court acknowledged this by stating, “[t]he age of 
[eighteen] is the point where society draws the line for many pur-
poses between childhood and adulthood.”29 Additionally, in the 
seminal case of Miller v. Alabama, when the Supreme Court asked 
counsel where to draw the line between juveniles and adults, coun-
sel answered, “I would draw it at eighteen . . . because we’ve done 
that previously; we’ve done that consistently.”30 This social con-
struction is actually rather inconsistent, considering one is not al-
lowed to drink alcohol until age twenty-one, cannot rent a car until 
age twenty-five, and is not required to obtain personal health in-
surance until age twenty-six.31 These varying age restrictions make 
it clear that our society does not agree on an age that marks the 
onset of adulthood. Scientific research provides a more compelling 
answer.  
Recent brain studies reveal that youths aged eighteen- to twenty-
five have many of the same characteristics that make children less 
culpable for criminal behavior. There have been a substantial 
number of recently-published psychological studies and legal 
scholarship recognizing that the brain, most importantly the pre-
frontal cortex, continues developing until the mid-twenties, rather 
than stopping at age eighteen.32 The prefrontal cortex is essential 
for both impulse control and decision-making in complex or high-
stress situations and “[t]he fact remains that young people between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-five do not have fully-developed 
capacity to control impulses and make rational choices.”33 
                                                   
 28. See id.; Cruz, 2018 WL 1541898, at *17–18. 
 29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added). 
 30. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (No. 10-9646). 
 31. Pimentel, supra note 5, at 83–85. 
 32. Id. at 84; see Arain et al., supra note 5; see generally Arnett, supra note 5. 
 33. Pimentel, supra note 5, at 84. 
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Reduced juvenile culpability has commonly been attributed to 
the underdevelopment of the pre-frontal cortex.34 Children and 
youth are less culpable than fully-developed adults because their 
delayed brain development makes them prone to poor-decision 
making and peer pressure, reduces their understanding of long-
term consequences of their behavior, and means they lack the self-
control to refrain from engaging in risky behavior.35 This is because 
“[t]he prefrontal cortex is central to what psychologists call ‘execu-
tive functions,’ advanced thinking processes that are employed in 
planning ahead and controlling impulses, and in weighing the 
costs and benefits of decisions before acting.”36 The less mature 
parts of the prefrontal cortex have been shown to influence 
youth’s actions by “diminish[ing] [the] capacity to exercise self-
control to inhibit inappropriate actions, desires, and emotions in 
favor of appropriate ones.”37 Studies show that this part of the 
brain causes youth to rely on “gut reactions, instinct, and overall 
emotional responses” in contrast to adults who rely on “judgment, 
reason, and planning” when they act.38 As the prefrontal cortex de-
velops, this diminished capacity will fade and socially acceptable 
behavior will override emotionally driven behavior.39 In this way, 
before the brain fully matures, a youth will likely “grow out of anti-
social behavior patterns” which “renders him susceptible to reha-
bilitation”40 and thus renders the personalities of those aged eight-
een- to twenty-five “more transitory, less fixed.”41 
Since these characteristics make eighteen- to twenty-five-year-
olds “in many respects . . . more similar to juveniles than to 
adults,”42 they are more receptive to rehabilitation just like juve-
                                                   
 34. See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in 
Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 859, 860 (1999); see generally Elizabeth C. 
Kingston, Validating Montgomery’s Recharacterization of Miller: An End to LWOP for Juveniles, 
38 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 23 (2016). 
 35. See Alex A. Stamm, Young Adults are Different Too: Why and How We Can Create a Better 
Justice System for Young People Age 18 to 25, 95 TEX. L. REV. 72, 74 (2017); see generally Kingston, 
supra note 34; JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, 
A.B.A. (Jan. 2004), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Adolescence.pdf. 
 36. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 44 
(2008). 
 37. Cohen et al., supra note 24, at 783. “Taken together, the findings suggest that young 
adulthood is a developmental period when cognitive capacity is still vulnerable to negative 
emotional influences.” Id. at 787. 
 38. Melissa S. Caulum, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience, 
Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729, 741 (discussing Sarah 
Spinks, One Reason Teens Respond Differently to the World: Immature Brain Circuitry, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/work/onereason.html). 
 39. Cohen et al., supra note 24 at 784. 
 40. Stamm, supra note 35, at 74. 
 41. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
 42. JAMES C. HOWELL ET AL., BULLETIN 5: YOUNG OFFENDERS AND AN EFFECTIVE 
RESPONSE IN THE JUVENILE AND ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEMS: WHAT HAPPENS, WHAT SHOULD 
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niles. A child without a fully-developed brain is better suited for 
rehabilitation because “with time and attendant neurological de-
velopment,” the child’s “deficiencies will be reformed.”43 Addition-
ally, because their unformed character is easily malleable—
especially by social and peer influence—they are “better candidates 
for rehabilitation.”44 In fact, “there is a growing consensus that ado-
lescence is likely to be a period of heightened brain plasticity—the 
capacity of the brain to change in response to experience—not un-
like the first few years of life.”45 Youth are more likely to remold 
their behaviors as they fully develop since “the same peak in do-
pamine that makes dangerous behaviors so appealing also increas-
es an adolescent’s ability to learn and to rehabilitate.”46 Some stud-
ies suggest that focusing on rehabilitation for youth in this age 
group decreases recidivism rates, highlighting one of the many po-
tential benefits of a rehabilitative approach.47 
The final stages of brain maturation typically occur around age 
twenty-five.48 Until offenders are developmentally mature, they 
cannot be fully accountable for their actions.49 They are therefore 
similarly situated to a child when considering diminished criminal 
                                                   
HAPPEN, AND WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW 24 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/242935.pdf. 
 43. Cohen et al., supra note 24 at 774; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 44. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social 
Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 647 (2016). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 
(explaining that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and 
outside pressures, including peer pressure”); Carly Loomis-Gustafson, Adjusting the Bright-
Line Age of Accountability Within the Criminal Justice System: Raising the Age of Majority to Age 21 
Based on the Conclusions of Scientific Studies Regarding Neurological Development and Culpability, 55 
DUQ. L. REV. 221, 237 (2017) (“The juvenile brain’s sensitivity to social influences makes the 
focus on rehabilitation in these years the key to encouraging substantive behavioral chang-
es.”). 
 45. Scott et al., supra note 44, at 652. 
 46. See Loomis-Gustafson, supra note 44, at 233. 
 47. Scott et al., supra note 44, at 663 n.144 (explaining that Colorado’s Youthful Of-
fender Service houses youth aged eighteen and nineteen in facilities which provide “special-
ly designed programs and services that focus on academics, rehabilitation, and the devel-
opment of prosocial behaviors and reentry planning. The recidivism rates of offenders who 
successfully complete the YOS program (most offenders) is far better than comparable of-
fenders.”). 
 48. See Arain et al., supra note 5; Pimentel, supra note 5, at 85. See generally Arnett, supra 
note 5. 
 49. It is true that developmental maturity is a process, not a specific point in time. This 
is why it is important to emphasize that some eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds, just like some 
children under the age of eighteen, achieve developmental maturity much earlier than oth-
ers. If an individualized consideration reveals that this is the case, the youth can still be 
waived to adult court just like our current juvenile system already allows. See Caulum, supra 
note 38, at 748 (“[W]aiver is based on a flexible approach to sentencing and a determina-
tion of the juvenile’s capacity for rehabilitation.”). 
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culpability.50 This diminished capacity is supported by neurosci-
ence which “tells us that we should expect some irrational, emo-
tion-driven behavior from emerging adults, those aged eighteen to 
twenty-five, and that it is not until their late twenties that it is rea-
sonable to expect them to have the brain development necessary to 
behave like fully rational adults.”51 This growing research on brain 
development should be considered when determining appropriate 
punishments for criminal defendants under twenty-five. 
Research shows that once the brain is fully developed, criminal 
behavior significantly decreases. This is what many researchers re-
fer to as the “age-crime curve.”52 The age-crime curve tells us that, 
in general, a person’s propensity for criminal behavior begins 
around “puberty, peaks at age twenty, and then decreases” signifi-
cantly during the mid-twenties.53 Therefore, “adolescents and indi-
viduals in their early twenties are more likely than either children 
or adults to engage in risky behavior.”54 The peak age for crime in-
volvement is younger than twenty-five for most types of crime.55 
Although we see a high amount of crime committed prior to age 
twenty-five, the age-crime curve indicates that most will desist from 
crime either in late adolescence or early adulthood.56 Only an es-
timated five percent of youth offenders will continue committing 
crimes in adulthood.57 This is because adolescent experimentation 
in risk-taking is transient for most individuals.58 
Given this behavioral trend, by sentencing youth aged eighteen- 
to twenty-five to the same lengthy sentences as adults, too many 
young offenders are sitting in prisons when they likely no longer 
pose a danger to society.59 These offenders tend to abstain from 
                                                   
 50. See id. at 743 (“Because the prefrontal cortex governs impulsivity, judgment, plan-
ning for the future, and foresight of consequences, it is responsible for the very characteris-
tics that may make one morally culpable.”). 
 51. Pimentel, supra note 5, at 84. 
 52. E.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 36, at 53. 
 53. Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions About 
Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REVS.: NEUROSCI. 513, 515 fig.1 (2013). See also 
Liza Little, Miller v. Alabama: A Proposed Solution for a Court that Feels Strongly Both Ways, 88 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1493, 1505 (2015). 
 54. Steinberg, supra note 53, at 515. 
 55. Jeffery T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship: Social Varia-
tion, Social Explanations, in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY: ON 
THE ORIGINS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINALITY 377, 377 (Kevin M. Beaver et al. eds., 
2014), https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/60294_Chapter_23.pdf. 
 56. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 36, at 53. 
 57. Id. 
 58. L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 
NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 417, 421 (2000). 
 59.  See Stamm, supra note 35, at 75 (“A large longitudinal study of serious young of-
fenders aged 14 to 25 found no difference in recidivism rates (among comparable youth) 
from imprisonment instead of probation, or from longer terms of imprisonment.”). 
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crime as their brains develop, “reducing any incapacitation bene-
fits of long sentences.”60 Additionally, “aging out” of crime is much 
more likely if the youth has “enhanced social connections” with the 
opportunity to develop “an identity, sense of purpose, or self-
awareness” which is improbable if the youth is in a prison cell.61 
Placing youth of this age group into the punitive adult system can 
actually increase the probability of recidivism because “the suscep-
tibility of the juvenile brain to peer influences that makes rehabili-
tation so effective may backfire when the youth is placed in a nega-
tive environment, such as the adult prison system.”62 Since the 
neurological research and age-crime curve shows that youths aged 
eighteen- to twenty-five are likely to be rehabilitated back to a 
crime-free life, focusing on treatment instead of punishment has 
the potential to benefit the offender and society in general to give 
youth a chance to redeem themselves by becoming productive 
adults. 
C.  Evolving Trends of Raising the Age 
These recent breakthroughs in brain research have contributed 
to the legal community’s increasing support for raising the juvenile 
age beyond eighteen. In 2018, the District Court of Connecticut 
held in Cruz v. United States that Miller applied to eighteen-year-
olds.63 Significantly, though in dicta, the court recognized there 
could be a justification for Miller and Roper to extend beyond age 
eighteen.64 The court found the consistent trend acknowledging 
that adolescents over age eighteen are different from fully-
developed adults to be persuasive.65 It noted that a Kentucky state 
court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional “as applied” to 
those under twenty-one based on a “consistent direction of 
change” showing that the “national consensus is growing more and 
more opposed to the death penalty as applied to defendants eight-
een (18) to twenty-one (21).”66 The Kentucky Court concluded this 
                                                   
 60. Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and Mass Incarcera-
tion, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 669, 714. 
 61. See DANIEL P. KEATING, SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE REGARDING THE 
IMPACT OF EARLY TRAUMA ON ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND RISK BEHAVIOR 9 (Aug. 
2018). 
 62. Loomis-Gustafson, supra note 44, at 239. 
 63. Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 
2018) (holding that mandatory life without parole sentences were unconstitutional for 
eighteen-year-old offenders). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at *21. 
 66. Id. (quoting Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 
No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559, at *3 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 7th Div. Aug. 1, 2017)). 
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based on the fact that since Roper, there has not only been an in-
creased abolition of the death penalty in general but that seven 
states now have a de facto prohibition on executing youth under 
age twenty-one.67 
The Cruz court also noted that all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia now recognize an extended age jurisdiction for juvenile 
courts beyond age eighteen.68 Additionally, it found persuasive that 
the American Bar Association urged the death penalty be ruled 
unconstitutional for individuals under twenty-one due to the “sci-
entific understanding of adolescent brain development” and “legis-
lative developments in the legal treatment of individuals in late 
adolescence.”69 The court acknowledged the scientific research 
showing the brain is not fully developed until early to mid-
twenties.70 Testimony from adolescent development expert Dr. 
Laurence Steinberg71 revealed that an individual’s impulse control 
as well as emotional regulation continues to develop until the mid-
twenties.72 Dr. Steinberg’s research showed greater risk-taking and 
reward-sensitive behavior among youths when in company of their 
peers up until about age twenty-four.73 He noted that after age 
twenty-four, adults begin to refrain from this behavior and behave 
in a similar capacity whether they are alone or in the company of 
peers.74  
In conformity with progressive caselaw, multiple states have been 
experimenting with different reforms to account for the harmful 
gap in protections for eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds in the crim-
inal system. For example, in 2016, Vermont’s governor signed a bill 
making any juvenile under twenty-one charged with a nonviolent 
crime eligible for juvenile offender status.75 It also requires the De-
partment of Corrections to provide separate facilities for any of-
fender age twenty-five and below, meaning eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-olds may only be housed in facilities specifically designated for 
youths.76 The bill was motivated by scientific research revealing that 
the brain is not fully developed until the mid-twenties and that 
“[t]he eighteenth birthday is not magical; you do not suddenly be-
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come a full-fledged adult.”77 Vermont hopes to emphasize rehabili-
tation for these older offenders to prevent them from committing 
future crimes and assisted them in aging out of criminal behavior.78 
Additionally, there have been bills proposed in Illinois, Connecti-
cut, and Massachusetts to raise the juvenile jurisdiction age to 
twenty-one.79 Both Brooklyn and San Francisco have recently ex-
perimented with separate court systems for youths aged sixteen to 
twenty-four focusing on the developmental and neuroscience-
based factors that make children different from adults.80 In these 
unique court systems, there are dedicated defense attorneys, pros-
ecutors, judges, and social workers who are trained on neurosci-
ence developments by experts in the field.81 
Connecticut has also recently developed a new repurposed hous-
ing unit called Cheshire Correctional Institute, where staff mem-
bers work with men aged eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds and fo-
cus on reintegration and rehabilitation.82 The Institute uses a 
program called Truthfulness, Respect, Understanding, and Elevat-
ing (TRUE) which is “designed specifically to address the needs of 
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-old offenders” and helps inmates de-
velop through family programs, education, and mentorship.83 
These housing units were created because “[y]ounger criminals of-
ten act on impulse and are better served by a nurturing, supportive 
environment, rather than one that is strictly punitive.”84 Research is 
still in progress regarding the effect of the program on recidivism, 
but “disciplinary issues inside the TRUE unit are virtually nonexist-
ent” while outside the unit, “[y]ounger inmates account for about 
twenty-five percent of disciplinary incidents.”85 As a result of the 
program’s success, Connecticut is hoping to expand the housing 
throughout the state and across genders.86 
Many other countries are following this trend. Young people can 
be treated as juveniles up to age twenty-one in Germany, twenty-
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three in the Netherlands, and twenty-five in Switzerland.87 The 
Netherlands even uses forensic and probation psychologists to 
evaluate and recommend whether the youth should be treated as a 
juvenile or an adult.88 Additionally, the Sentencing Advisory Coun-
cil of Victoria in the United Kingdom has advocated for a separate 
system for youths up to age twenty-five that focuses more on “spe-
cific developmental needs in order to help the offender’s rehabili-
tation and re-integration.”89 Trends in the United States and in 
foreign countries recognize that eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds 
would benefit from a more rehabilitative criminal justice system. 
II. ACCOUNTING FOR YOUTHFULNESS UNDER THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT 
A.  Kids Must Be Treated like Kids 
Roper, Graham, and Miller all establish a constitutional principle 
that children are unique, and therefore must be treated differently 
from adults in the context of punishment and sentencing. The 
Court in Graham stated that “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the 
Eighth Amendment” so “criminal procedure laws that fail to take 
defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”90 
Although these cases defined “children” as persons under age 
eighteen, the Court’s reasoning applies to eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-olds as well, as discussed in Part I. Therefore, to not treat 
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as youths violates Eighth Amend-
ment principles. The Court needs to revisit the age cutoff, or else it 
risks perpetuating constitutional violations against this group of of-
fenders. There have been numerous articles arguing that drawing 
the line at eighteen is problematic.91 This Note agrees with that 
proposition, but further argues that it is required by the Eighth 
Amendment for individuals under the age of twenty-five to have 
their youthfulness considered at every stage of the criminal process 
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in order to avoid excessive punishments. It is unconstitutional un-
der the Eighth Amendment for these youths to be automatically 
treated as if they were adults, and each eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-old requires individualized consideration of their youthfulness 
and developmental capacity prior to conviction.92 
Juveniles do not have a constitutional right to be tried in juve-
nile courts. The Eighth Amendment does, however, require that 
youthful defendants receive age-appropriate punishment propor-
tional to his or her culpability. If the defendant has diminished 
culpability because of his or her young age and is receptive to re-
habilitation, the court is obligated to treat the youthful defendant 
differently than an adult and take youthfulness into account at eve-
ry stage of the process, not just at sentencing. This includes eight-
een- to twenty-five-year-olds. 
B.  The Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Excessive Punishments 
Currently, eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are typically tried 
and punished in our criminal justice system without consideration 
of their lessened culpability due to age.93 The United States Consti-
tution prohibits this; more specifically, the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits punishments that are excessive in relation to the moral 
culpability of the offender.94 The Court decides whether the Eighth 
Amendment is violated by viewing proportionality “according to 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society.”95 The Court determined in Roper, Graham, and Mil-
ler that the necessary age cutoff should remain at eighteen because 
that has usually been the line drawn in society between childhood 
and adulthood.96 The Court must reexamine this premise and up-
date its previous Eighth Amendment holdings given the constantly 
developing neuroscience research and society’s evolving views of 
acceptable punishments for youths.97 
                                                   
 92. Although some eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds may have the requisite develop-
mental maturity to be fully culpable for their crimes, that is a determination for the jury or 
judge to decide. The burden should be on the prosecutor to show an eighteen- to twenty-
five-year-old has the developmental capacity of an adult. 
 93. See Kelsey B. Shust, Extending Sentencing Mitigation for Deserving Young Adults, 104 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 701 (2014) (advocating for a case-by-case evaluation of a de-
fendant’s youthfulness for defendants under age twenty-five). 
 94. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
 95. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012). 
 96. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 97. The Court regularly engages in this sort of reexamination. See, e.g., Graham, 560 
U.S. 48 (holding the Eighth Amendment categorically bans juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
from receiving mandatory life without the possibility of parole); Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (extend-
ing Graham’s previous holding to include juvenile homicide crimes due to evolving stand-
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1.  Why the Eighth Amendment Requires Miller, Graham, and Roper to 
Apply to Eighteen- to Twenty-Five-Year-Olds 
As previously indicated, youth is a major factor in deciding 
whether a punishment is constitutionally excessive under the 
Eighth Amendment. Justice Roberts stated in Graham, “an offend-
er’s juvenile status can play a central role in considering a sen-
tence’s proportionality.”98 In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Court 
looked at and relied heavily on brain science to determine that ju-
veniles have diminished culpability.99 This research found youth 
have certain characteristics that make harsh punishments dispro-
portionate, and therefore violate the Eighth Amendment. These 
characteristics include diminished maturity and responsibility that 
leads to risk-taking behavior, vulnerability to peer pressure, and 
underdeveloped character that is more prone to rehabilitation.100 
According to the Court, each of these characteristics demonstrate 
an ability to be rehabilitated.  
The Court has been reluctant to impose irrevocable sentences 
on a group that has a high propensity for change after neurologi-
cal development, precisely because the punishment then becomes 
disproportionate and constitutionally excessive.101 Since we cannot 
be sure of a youth’s potential, cutting off the prospect of growth 
defies our sense of morals: 
“[T]he malleability of adolescence” offers the prospect that 
an adolescent offender can alter his life course and develop 
a moral character as an adult. Executing a juvenile before 
he is a fully formed person and before we can reliably pre-
dict what sort of adult he will become forecloses the chance 
for this development and thus cannot be a reasoned moral 
response to the defendant’s character.102 
As argued in Part I, current research shows the brain is underde-
veloped until age twenty-five, resulting in an inability to fully assess 
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consequences, diminished capacity to make rational decisions, and  
increased susceptibility to peer pressure.103 Youths under twenty-
five therefore possess the same characteristics and potential for re-
form that the Court found persuasive in Miller, Graham, and Roper, 
finding Eighth Amendment violations and banning the death pen-
alty and mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.104 
Therefore, handing out these sentences to offenders aged eight-
een- to twenty-five must also violate the Eighth Amendment.105 
The death penalty and mandatory life without parole are sen-
tences that offer “no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no 
chance for reconciliation with society, no hope”106—a flat out rejec-
tion of rehabilitation with no possibility of reintegration into socie-
ty. It is impossible to close off the possibility of a youth offender 
transitioning into a reformed adult who will not commit crimes 
upon release given their incomplete brain development. These 
sentences deny the possibility of release even though research 
shows the propensity to commit crime significantly decreases after 
age twenty-five.107 The finality of these sentences takes away all pos-
sibility of growth and development, violating the Eighth Amend-
ment rights of not only juveniles, but also eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-olds with those same prospects of rehabilitation and reform. 
2.  Why the Eighth Amendment Requires Kids To Be Labeled as Kids 
The Eighth Amendment also requires eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-olds to be labeled as youths throughout criminal proceedings. 
The discussion above shows that the sentencing decisions in Roper, 
Graham, and Miller should also apply to eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-olds. However, the sentence itself is not the only stage of crim-
inal procedure that must be critically examined to prevent exces-
sive youth punishment. Justice Kagan suggested this in her Miller 
opinion, noting that treating children like adults throughout their 
criminal proceedings “ignores that [the offender] might have been 
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charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth.”108 
Unlike juveniles, eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are entitled to 
a jury trial. If juries do not consider the defendant’s youthfulness 
and diminished culpability, the defendant is more likely to be con-
victed for crimes that carry excessive sentences. The judge at sen-
tencing may have little discretion to lower sentences for these se-
vere crimes, especially if mandatory minimums apply. Additionally, 
it is typically juries who make sentencing determinations in death 
penalty cases. If age is not considered throughout the process, the 
ability to be charged and convicted of a lesser offense, or to not re-
ceive a death sentence, may vanish. To prevent this, eighteen- to 
twenty-five-year-olds must be labeled as youth (or even children, kids, 
emerging adults) from the outset, not as adults or even young adults, 
and scientific evidence must be given to juries in support of this la-
bel in order to avoid disproportionate punishments.109 
From the moment a youthful offender comes into contact with 
the criminal justice system, their age must play a role in their case. 
This is true for juvenile defendants under age eighteen,110 because 
“the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at 
a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”111 Youths are at 
high risk for erroneous convictions and excessive punishments be-
cause of their limited understanding of the system, unwillingness 
to cooperate due to wariness of trust in adults, and their lack of 
maturity. Youthful defendants have a special difficulty with legal 
representation, because “[t]hey are less likely than adults to work 
effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.”112 This may 
diminish the quality of the defendant’s representation, and a court 
or jury may be more likely to convict or provide an undeserving 
punishment. If counsel, the judge, and the jury were required to 
consider the defendant’s youthfulness and immaturity, these risks 
could be mitigated. 
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Youths are also vulnerable when they are given their Miranda 
rights and are more likely to give confessions under pressure.113 
This is why the Court ruled in J.D.B v. North Carolina that a juve-
nile’s age should be considered in the Miranda custody analysis.114 
The Court reasoned that the particular susceptibilities stemming 
from a child’s age requires treating the youth’s confession differ-
ently than an adult’s confession.115 Court’s performing a Miranda 
custody analysis ask whether an objectively reasonable officer 
would have known of the child’s youth and particular susceptibil-
ity.116 Eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds, who have the same “partic-
ular susceptibilities,” are automatically excluded from J.D.B.’s pro-
tections. By not labeling these offenders as children, courts can 
ignore age during the custody analysis and erroneously admit an 
innocuous confession, resulting in an unfair conviction and sen-
tence. Youthfulness is considered in other similar totality-of-the-
circumstances tests, such as those assessing consent and lineups. 
These various stages throughout the criminal procedure process 
can significantly impact the youth’s eventual punishment. 
It follows that if eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are not labeled 
as youths, the sentencer will be inclined to impose a stricter sen-
tence. Without this label, they will be less likely to believe the de-
fendant can be rehabilitated and will focus instead on the ideolo-
gies of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. The Court in 
Roper, Graham, and Miller determined that these penological justifi-
cations for punishments are less applicable to juvenile offenders 
because of their diminished culpability.117 Retribution is less com-
pelling because youth are less blameworthy.118 Deterrence cannot 
justify punishment since youth’s inability to fully assess conse-
quences means they are less likely to consider punishment before 
committing a crime.119 Lastly, incapacitation is irrelevant because 
“[d]eciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a danger to so-
ciety’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is incorrigi-
ble’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”120 Therefore,  
judges sentencing juveniles focus on rehabilitation and will usually 
look for alternatives to incarceration. When sentencing defendants 
over the age of eighteen, rehabilitation is typically not the focus 
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and the other justifications for punishment come to the forefront. 
Youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five have a similar diminished cul-
pability and should receive the same focus on rehabilitation as ju-
veniles. Labeling them as youths will promote rehabilitation-
motivated sentencing.  
It is also likely that jurors will be more sympathetic toward the 
defendant if they are properly informed of the defendant’s dimin-
ished culpability. It is a widely-held proposition that scientific re-
search is significantly persuasive for juries,121 and scientific research 
on youths’ underdeveloped brains and diminished culpability 
could significantly impact jury deliberation. Without being suffi-
ciently informed of this research, jurors might not be able to ap-
propriately consider the youthfulness of eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-old offenders. Roper, Graham, and Miller all suggest that this 
sort of uninformed jury deliberation is prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment.122  
The role of the jury is especially important to Eight Amendment 
challenges in death penalty cases, because in looking at evolving 
standards of decency, “the jury . . . is a significant and reliable ob-
jective index of contemporary values because it is so directly in-
volved.”123 Jury decisions are therefore a compelling indicator of 
society’s acceptance of certain types of punishment for particular 
groups of offenders. Jury-imposed death penalty sentences are par-
ticularly reflective, because these require a case-by-case sentencing 
decision. This is because “[a] central feature of death penalty sen-
tencing is a particular assessment of the circumstances of the crime 
and the characteristics of the offender. The system is designed to 
consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including 
youth, in every case.”124 Before the categorical ban announced in 
Roper, the jury still considered youth as a mitigating factor when 
imposing the death penalty for eligible juveniles when that mitiga-
tion evidence was presented.125 It was thus valid to infer that, in 
those cases, the jury’s decision reflected their acceptance of capital 
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punishment for that particular age group. Because our current 
criminal procedure processes do not account for eighteen- to 
twenty-five-year-olds’ diminished culpability, however, death penal-
ty sentences for eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are inherently less 
reflective of contemporary values and do not properly reflect the 
jury’s true acceptance of the death penalty for this particular age 
group. The Roper decision’s categorical ban on death penalty sen-
tences for offenders under age eighteen does not extend to those 
twenty-five and younger.126 Additionally, juries are not properly in-
formed of mitigation evidence showing neurological similarities of 
youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five with children under eighteen 
and the jury thus will not consider age or youth as a mitigating  
factor.  
Furthermore, it is not sufficient to assume that jurors, as reflec-
tions of society’s evolving standards of decency, are already consid-
ering eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as youths. In juvenile death 
penalty cases such as Roper, the trial judge instructs the jury to con-
sider youth as a mitigating factor. This judicial instruction is absent 
in cases involving eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds.127 It is not the 
jury’s responsibility to study the intricacies of complicated brain re-
search or to understand legally-accepted mitigating factors. It is the 
system’s duty to communicate this essential information to the jury 
and let them decide how the mitigating factor will impact their 
sentencing analysis. 
By automatically treating youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five as 
adults, our system sends a clear message that this group has equiva-
lent moral culpability and should be eligible for our society’s 
harshest sentences. With scientific research changing our under-
standing of neurodevelopment and decision-making processes, the 
Supreme Court must repudiate this message by updating the defi-
nition of “youth,” or else risk continued violations of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
III. COORDINATING REFORM THROUGH THE JUDICIARY, STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, AND CONGRESS 
 The Eighth Amendment violations stemming from our system’s 
failure to consider the youthfulness of youth aged eighteen- to 
twenty-five can and should be remedied by raising the upper age of 
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SUMMER 2020] Eighteen Is Not a Magic Number 827 
 
juvenile jurisdiction to age twenty-five. In order for this reform to 
be effective, courts, state governments, and Congress should im-
plement reforms designed to work in tandem. If these efforts are 
unsuccessful, these violations can still be addressed by mandating 
adequate consideration of eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds’ 
diminished culpability throughout criminal proceedings.  
A.  Remedying the Violation by Raising the Upper Age of Juvenile 
Jurisdiction to Twenty-Five 
   1.  The Court’s Role 
The Supreme Court must extend Miller, Roper, and Graham to of-
fenders age twenty-five and younger to stop repeated violations of 
their Eighth Amendment rights. Both the Eighth Amendment and 
the Miller line of cases support this reform. Such a holding would 
incentivize state governments to raise the upper age of juvenile ju-
risdiction to twenty-five. The Court would make it clear across ju-
risdictions that treating eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as pure 
adults in our criminal justice system offends our Constitution, and 
that the Eighth Amendment requires an acknowledgment of 
eighteen- to twenty-five year-olds’ youthfulness and lessened culpa-
bility throughout their interactions with the criminal justice system.  
2.  The Role of State Governments 
As discussed above, one of the most crucial reforms to aid in 
protecting this class is labeling eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as 
youth (or even children, kids, or emerging adults) so that youthfulness 
is considered at every stage of the process. The most practical and 
effective way to do this is by states extending the juvenile jurisdic-
tion majority age to twenty-five.128 This will send an unambiguous 
message that those under twenty-five years old are children who 
are less morally culpable than their adult counterparts and will 
significantly lessen the risk of disproportionate punishments. 
A Supreme Court holding extending the protections of the Mil-
ler line of cases to eighteen- to twenty-five year-olds will support this 
state-level reform. This doctrinal change will spark the conversa-
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tion among state legislatures and courts, thus encouraging states to 
pass legislation to protect this class and try eighteen- to twenty-five-
year-olds in juvenile courts. If states continued to try eighteen- to 
twenty-five-year-olds in adult court after this sort of Supreme Court 
holding, they would face practical and administrative challenges of 
accommodating the Miller, Graham, and Roper protections ad hoc 
to this specific group of defendants. This category of offenders 
would now require individualized consideration prior to receiving 
mandatory life without parole sentences and also would not be 
able to receive death penalty sentences. This patchwork of protec-
tions in adult court runs the risk of confusion, error, and mistaken 
sentencing, requiring additional judicial oversight to prevent 
Eighth Amendment violations. These practical challenges will in-
centivize states to automatically place eighteen- to twenty-five-year-
olds into the juvenile courts to promote fairness and judicial effi-
ciency. 
To be clear, this solution will not preclude eighteen- to twenty-
five-year-olds from being tried in adult court. If a state raises the 
majority age of juvenile jurisdiction to age twenty-five, all eighteen- 
to twenty-five-year-olds will then be considered a juvenile and ini-
tially charged in the juvenile court. However, the current juvenile 
system process will not change. A charged youth can still be trans-
ferred to adult court if the judge finds it reasonable to do so under 
the rules of that specific jurisdiction. Again, the Eighth Amend-
ment violation lies in the failure to consider age at all for eighteen- 
to twenty-five-year-olds in the criminal system, which inherently 
leads to excessive punishments. If a youth’s age and requisite ma-
turity level are considered prior to the transfer to adult court and 
still taken into account throughout the process, this will avoid un-
warranted and undeserved punishment. 
There are potential administrability concerns with this remedy. 
Given that eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds constitute a majority of 
criminal charges,129 requiring individualized review for every one of 
them prior to transfer is bound to be a burdensome task for judg-
es. It also generally costs more to try defendants in the juvenile sys-
tem than in the criminal system.130 However, the benefits of pro-
tecting this class from undeserved punishments far outweigh the 
possible costs to the system. We cannot allow repeated constitu-
tional violations for administrative benefit.131 
                                                   
 129. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 36, at 53. 
 130. Stamm, supra note 35, at 102. 
 131. See Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
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3.  The Congressional Role 
The states are entitled to choose the majority age of juvenile ju-
risdiction. Therefore, there will need to be additional incentive for 
states to raise the majority age to twenty-five, rather than choosing 
another alternative. Congress should incentivize states to adopt 
this new uniform majority jurisdictional age by using their spend-
ing power. Criminal law has historically been left to the states,132 
and Congress lacks the power to impose a nationwide jurisdictional 
age of majority. However, Congress does have the power to incen-
tivize states to adopt a law or provision through the Spending 
Clause by attaching “conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”133 
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court upheld Congress condi-
tioning highway funds on states setting the drinking age at twenty-
one.134 Not only was this congressional tactic constitutional, it was 
effective.135 Here, Congress could condition funds for the criminal 
system, such as those given for courts and prisons, on setting the 
floor for adult jurisdiction at age twenty-five. The Record Ex-
pungement Designed to Enhance Employment Act of 2017 
(REDEEM Act), recently re-introduced to the House in 2019, pro-
vides an informative example.136 The Act incentivizes states to raise 
the age of adult criminal responsibility to eighteen by giving pref-
erence to state grant applications for certain funding programs to 
those “that have set [eighteen] or older as the age of original juris-
diction for adult criminal courts.”137 Although this Act has not yet 
been passed, it shows how Congress can incentivize states to raise 
the jurisdictional age minimums. 
Congressional incentives must pass constitutional scrutiny. Con-
gress’ spending powers are not unlimited but instead are subject to 
restrictions set forth in Dole.138 These restrictions require condi-
tional spending measures to be in pursuit of the general welfare, 
unambiguous as to the funding’s conditions, conditioned by mat-
ters related to the national concern, not coercive, and not barred 
by any other Constitutional provision.139 Using the Spending Power 
                                                   
 132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (“Under our federal system, 
the ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.’” (quoting 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993))). 
 133. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
  134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 211. 
 136. REDEEM Act, H.R. 2410, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 137. See Press Release, House Committee on the Judiciary, Cummings, Nadler, Bass, and 
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to incentivize states to increase the age of juvenile jurisdiction satis-
fies each of these requirements. 
First, protecting eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds in the criminal 
justice system is unquestionably in pursuit of the general welfare. 
In determining whether a congressional spending measure is “in 
pursuit of the general welfare,” reviewing courts only need to find 
that the legislation is “reasonably calculated to advance the general 
welfare.”140 Courts defer substantially to Congress’ judgment in an-
swering this question.141 As set forth in Parts I and II of this Note, 
subjecting eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds to excessive punish-
ments is morally and constitutionally problematic. If Congress 
finds that incentivizing the states to protect this class will reduce 
recidivism, keep children from a life of crime, improve economic 
output, save money by driving down incarceration rates, and make 
our communities safer—all of which would clearly advance the 
general welfare—then the courts should defer to that judgment.  
Second, the unambiguous requirement can be addressed at the 
drafting stage. Congress must simply write the statute to ensure 
states know the consequences of their participation in the funding 
plan, or lack thereof.142  
Third, the requirement that the spending’s “condition” be di-
rectly related to a national concern is easily satisfied. The condi-
tion here is prohibiting excessive punishments for youthful of-
fenders in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This condition will 
ensure youth are protected from unwarranted criminal punish-
ments by placing them in the correct court system—the juvenile 
system that focuses on rehabilitation rather than punishment.  
Fourth, Congress can meet the “coercion” prong by limiting the 
amount of funds withheld from states who do not adopt the condi-
tion. The withholding amount must be small enough to constitute 
a “mild encouragement,” rather than being so excessive that “pres-
sure turns into compulsion.”143  
Lastly, states adopting twenty-five as the floor for adult jurisdic-
tion meets the “unexceptional proposition” in third prong as it 
does not independently violate any constitutional rights.144 
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B.  Remedying the Violation by Considering Age 
Throughout the Criminal Process 
If states do not increase their age of majority to twenty-five, al-
ternative safeguards will be necessary to protect against excessive 
punishments. At the bare minimum, age needs to be a considered 
factor for eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds throughout their time 
with the adult criminal justice system to avoid Eighth Amendment 
violations. This will be more of a practical shift than a doctrinal 
one. State judicial systems will need to expand their definition of 
“youth” to include those twenty-five and younger, and defendants 
under twenty-five should receive enhanced protections throughout 
their criminal proceedings, from bail to sentencing.145 District at-
torneys would be required to consider these defendants’ youthful-
ness in all prosecutorial decisions, and defense attorneys could use 
it to advocate for their client. Even if states do extend the majority 
age of jurisdiction to twenty-five, this proposed reform should still 
apply if juveniles are transferred to adult court. 
Additionally, every criminal justice professional involved in ju-
venile cases should be required to complete trainings on the dif-
ferences between juveniles and adults, with up-to-date scientific re-
search explaining how the human brain begins to reach adult 
maturity at age twenty-five. Throughout these trainings, eighteen- 
to twenty-five-year-olds should be labeled as “youths” and partici-
pants should be instructed to treat them as juveniles throughout 
their interactions with the criminal justice system accordingly. It 
should be made unmistakably clear that these individuals’ brains 
are still developing, which contributes to reduced culpability. De-
fense attorneys should be informed that their client’s youth may 
make them distrusting or uncooperative, and that he or she will 
need to put in more work to gain his or her client’s trust. 
Police officers should take age into account when conducting 
interrogations, and must understand that youths are more vulner-
able to pressure and may produce false confessions. The judiciary 
should also take account of age and corresponding immaturity lev-
el at every stage of the criminal justice process, including pleas, 
bail, and sentencing. Age should also be taken into account when 
reviewing the interrogations, similar to the standard set forth in 
JDB v. California.146 Judges should be sure to label eighteen- to 
                                                   
 145. See Cynthia Soohoo, You Have the Right to Remain a Child: The Right to Juvenile Treat-
ment for Youth in Conflict with the Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) (explaining 
that other countries outside the United States “provide youth with enhanced protections in 
the adult system that take their age into account”). 
 146. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (U.S. 2011). 
832 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:4 
 
twenty-five-year-olds as youths in opinions, sending the message to 
society that this is a less culpable group of individuals. Age and de-
velopmental maturity should be thoroughly considered prior to 
handing out a sentence and should be an explicit, required con-
sideration in sentencing guidelines. Prior to sentencing, juries 
should have access to the neurological research and receive a clear 
instruction to consider said research during the trial stage. Juries 
should be instructed to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor 
for sentencing purposes. Taken together, these efforts to include 
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as youths, and not adults, will af-
ford them appropriate treatment throughout the criminal justice 
process and will protect against excessive punishments, thus avoid-
ing Eighth Amendment violations. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants between ages eighteen- to twenty-five are inade-
quately protected in the criminal justice system. By automatically 
treating this class as “adults,” despite the fact that research suggests 
the contrary, these individuals are vulnerable to excessive punish-
ments in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. This Note 
advocates for three remedies, which ideally would be implemented 
together, to protect against cruel and unusual punishments for 
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds. First, the Supreme Court must 
extend the holdings of Miller, Roper, and Graham to offenders below 
age twenty-five. Second, every state should increase their upper age 
of juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five. Third, Congress should use 
their spending power to incentivize states to increase their upper 
age of juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five. If states do not imple-
ment these reforms, or even if they do, systemic safeguards should 
be implemented at every stage in the criminal process to ensure 
age is a considered factor. 
